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~icta Observes 
II 
A committee of students from the University of Denver School of 
Law has requested and received permission to "take over" our May issue. 
The Editors have allowed that committee the responsibility of selecting 
and editing the material herein presented, all of which was written by 
members of the Senior Class. 
DIVORCE--STALEMATE 
By ALFRED HEINICKE, School of Law, 1939, Denver 
University 
FOR many years the Colorado legislature struggled to make more certain the status of those who had taken steps to receive divorces a vinculo matrimonii, and to 
provide that the uncertain period between the first findings 
and the final decree be not extended unreasonably, nor the 
parties be suspended indefinitely between the married status 
and the unmarried because of the whim of one of th~ parties. 
Chapter 90, S. L. 1925, page 23 7, attempted to em-
power the court to issue a final decree upon application of the 
guilty party to take care of that situation; for example, where 
a wife had sued her husband for divorce a vinculo and findings 
had been entered in her favor, entitling her to a decree at or 
after six months, yet had not availed herself of that right. 
The act sought to make status more definite by allowing the 
husband to ask that the wife be given her final decree. 1 
Chapter 91, page 327, of the Session Laws of 1929, was 
an effort to make the findings of fact and the conclusions of 
law entered on a petition for divorce operate as a decree of 
divorce after six months from entry thereof, if within that 
period nothing was done to set aside the findings. 1 
Finally by the 1933 Session Laws. page 440, the legisla-
ture provided for interlocutory decrees of divorce and gave 
such interlocutory decrees the full sanction accorded to judg-
''25 act and '29 act discussed in Cartier v. Cartier, 88 Colo. 76; see also Laizure 
v. Baker, 91 Colo. 292. and cases in note 2. 
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ments, the mere lapse of time to make them final without any 
further action of the court. 2 
The 193 3 act went further to declare it Colorado's public 
policy that rights be rendered certain and that public welfare 
demanded that divorce actions be finally determined within a 
reasonable time after the trial, 3 i. e. that parties to a divorce 
action be not overlong neither finally divorced nor truly mar-
ried. 
Yet the same legislature embedded in our statutory law 
that anomalous divorce known as divorce a mensa et thoro, 
or limited divorce. 4 A divorce which throws the 'parties to it 
back on society in the undefined and dangerous character of a 
wife without a husband and a husband without a wife, and 
in the words of Vernier, has as its primary effect a destruction 
of the right of cohabitation, and as its chief characteristic that 
it does not destroy the marriage. 5 
"Thus it leaves the parties in the position of unmarried persons, in 
relation to each other, deprived of the pleasures and freed from the duties 
incident upon cohabitation. Yet, as to the rest of the world, they are 
still married * * * requiring a degree of chastity scarcely to be ex-
pected in an ordinary mortal, for it leaves neither party free to marry 
again and is no defense to a criminal charge, either of bigamy or adul-
tery. " 5 
"This proceeding is, while destitute of justice, one of the most cor-
rupting devices ever imposed by serious .natures on blindness and cre-
dulity. It was tolerated only because men believed as a part of their 
religion, that dissolution would be an offense against God; whence the 
slope was easy toward any compromise with good sense; and as the fruit 
of compromise we have this ill begotten monster of divorce amensa et 
thoro, made up of pious doctrine and worldly stupidity. In almost 
every place where marriage is known, this folly walks with her-the 
queen and the slut, the pure and the foul, the bright and the dark, dwell 
together. " 6 
The Colorado Ace gives the right to maintain an action 
for divorce a mensa et thoro to the wife, upon any ground 
"For holdings based on this statute see Kastner v. Kastner, 55 P. (2d) 947, and 
Morris v. Probst, 55 P. (2d) 944 (also discusses 1925 and '29 provisions). 
'Morris v. Probst, supra. 
•session Laws 1933, chapter 72; C. S. A. chapter 56, sections 25-32. 
•vernier, American Family Laws, Vol. II, page 341. 
•Joel Prentus Bishop, New Commentaries on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, 
Vol. I. sec. 68, quoted in Vernier, supra, sec. 114. 
'C. S. A. chapter 56, sections 25-32. It is perhaps trivial to note that the act 
placing this divorce (among other things) in our statutes was declared so necessary for 
immediate preservation of public peace, health and safety that an emergency existed and 
that a "safety clause" was attached to make it immediately effective. 
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provided by law for divorce or where the wife has been aban-
doned by the husband without just cause or excuse, and a rec-
onciliation is not probable and it would be just or proper to 
grant such relief and upon any ground generally recognized in 
equity. 
What is the justification for this divorce in Colorado, 
where reconciliation is promoted by the use of interlocutory 
decrees, where the other advantages of such divorce may be had 
under a decree of absolute divorce without the injustice of a 
limited divorce? If the act is based on religious feelings against 
divorce a vinculo, why is the right given only to wives, or is it 
that wives are more religious in Colorado? 
Suppose a case where a husband and wife are incompat-
ible: Certainly no one longer believes that in divorces the guilt 
is all on one side and virtue all on the other (although Colo~ 
rado still holds that if both parties are guilty they shall remain 
in holy deadlock) .8 But suppose an "innocent" wife obtains 
a limited divorce from her "guilty" husband and has received 
what property9 she wishes and custody of the children. She 
may be fairly content with her life and also determined that 
her husband shall remain a husband, yet not a husband. Why 
otherwise the limited divorce? 
While the act of '33 does provide that the decree of sepa~ 
ration a mensa et thoro shall not bar either of the parties from 
subsequently bringing and maintaining an action for divorce, 
and the wife could, if she wished, obtain an absolute divorce 
on the same grounds that she obtained her limited divorce, 
assuming the original grounds were sufficient for absolute di-
vorce, what can the "guilty" husband do? He has no grounds 
that existed before his wife's decree (having been declared the 
guilty party). Certainly his grounds must arise after her 
decree, and perhaps his wife is careful to see that he has no 
grounds; she may even lead a chaste and proper life. She is in 
the position of a wife, yet under no personal duties to her 
husband, a wife who may live apart from her husband and yet 
not be guilty of desertion, although her repentant husband 
may ask her to come back. 10 
"C. S. A. chapter 56, section 7. 
•see C. S. A. chapter 56, section 28. 
'"Williams v. Williams (an Arizona case), 265 P. 87, 61 A. L. R. 126-4. 
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The husband is denied the freedom from the bonds of 
matrimony while he is cut off from association with his wife 
and children and exposed to their indifference and perhaps 
hatred. The wrong done him is not a legal one for which the 
law affords redress, for presumptively his own wrongful con-
duct brought about his altered status.10 Nor may he seek a 
more congenial companion for another attempt at being a good 
husband.11 
In all fairness it is difficult to see why these sociologically 
unhealthy situations should be allowed to arise in Colorado 
and to be fostered by our statutes, when Colorado has been 
progressive enough to abolish action for breach of promise, 
alienation of affections, and civil actions for seduction. 
It is true that Colorado, by the decisions of its courts, 
has long allowed an action for separate maintenance or ali-
mony without divorce,12 but it is to be questioned whether 
the action is entitled to the further sanction of a statute. It is 
"An interesting point is also raised by S. L. '33, chapter 72, section 6; C. S. A. 
chapter 56, section 30. providing, as to separate maintenance decrees, that such a decree 
granted in this state shall not be defeated or affected, or barred in any way, by any 
decree of divorce obtained by one of the parties in some other state or country, if no 
personal service within such state or country was had upon the party adversely affected 
by such decree of divorce, and if such party did not presonally appear in such action: 
and such decree of divorce so obtained shall not be used as a bar or estoppel to, or be 
admitted in evidence in any proceeding to enforce, or concerning, affecting, or involving 
in any way such decree of separate maintenance. Evidently a wife who has received a 
Colorado separate maintenance decree may, if it so please her, later obtain a divorce in 
another state, yet, under certain conditions, still sue in Colorado on the separate main-
tenance decree without fear of her husband submitting her foreign divorce decree by 
way of estoppel or bar. 
"See Daniels v. Daniels, 9 Colo. 133, 10 P. 657, a Supreme Court case holding 
alimony to be within the jurisdiction of courts of equity independently of statute and 
to be a relief which might be granted although no divorce was prayed: Hanscom v. 
Hanscom (1895), 6 C. A. 97, 39 P. 885, saying a court of equity independent of 
statute has jurisdiction to award alimony, even when no divorce is sought: Dye v. Dye 
(1897), 9 C. A. 320, 48 P. 313, holding a wife may maintain a suit in equity to com-
pel payment of alimony where separate maintenance is the only relief prayed, and that 
the power in equity to entertain such a suit by a wife is not affected by S. L. 1893, 
making neglect of a wife a misdemeanor and providing punishment therefor: In re 
Popejoy (1899), 26 Colo. 32, 77 Am. St. Rep. 222, 55 P. 1083, holding it settled 
by the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals that an action 
for separate maintenance may be maintained and that the wife, in a proper case, is entitled 
to a judgment for separate maintenance though she does not seek or wish a legal separa-
tion a vinculo: Austin v. Austin (1908), 42 Colo. 130, 94 P. 309, cited in notes 38 
L. R. A. (NS) 594, Ann. Cases 1912A 938, Ann. Cases 1916A 857, 6 A. L. R. 70, 
81, 40 A. L. R. 1240, holding a district court has jurisdiction of a suit by a wife for 
separate maintenance independently of a divorce action or of a criminal proceeding for 
the husband's failure to provide reasonable support: Fahey v. Fahey, 43 Colo. 354. 
96 P. 251. 127 Am. St. Rep. 118, 18 L. R. A. (NS) 1147, holding it is settled in 
this state that a wife may maintain an action against her husband for separate main-
tenance indepmdent of an action for divorce. 
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submitted that rather than perpetuate the right, it would be 
better to eliminate it. 
The first mention of the action that I have been able to 
find in the Colorado statutes is in the rather indefinite provi-
sions in the general divorce statute of 1917,13 amended in part 
in 192 7, 14 unrepealed by the 193 3 statute and still existing in 
our law. This seems merely a lefthanded and perhaps uncon-
scious recognition of the action as existing and affects only 
procedural matter therein.11:. 
There is a difference, of course, between divorce a mensa 
et thoro and separate maintenance, but to my mind it has be-
come almost indistinct, certainly the decisions are confused. 
Ballentine's College Law Dictionary defines divorce a mensa 
et thoro as "a divorce which operated as a mere temporary sep-
aration, leaving all the other marital rights and obligations in 
full force during the life of the parties and being subject to the 
complete restoration of the marital status by reconciliation. 
In the ecclesiastical courts proceedings for such a divorce 
sought a separation for causes arising after the marriage and 
admitted the validity of the marriage;" and separate mainte-
nance as "the condition or status of a married woman who is 
18S. L. I9I7, chapter 65, section 2, paragraph 3 (Compiled Laws '21. section 
5594; C. S. A .. chapter 56, section 3). In any action for separate maintenance the 
answer of the defendant shall contain: I. A general or specific denial of each material 
allegation in the complaint intended to be controverted by the defendant. 2. A state-
ment of any new matter constituting a defense or constituting an action for divorce, in 
ordinary and concise language, without unnecessary repetition. The section also deals 
with jurisdiction as to divorce and separate maintenance. 
S. L. I917, chapter 65, section 6. (C. L. sec. 5598; C. S. A. chapter 56, sec. 7.) 
In any action for divorce the defendant may file a cross complaint in which may be set 
forth any one or more causes for divorce or separate maintenance against the plaintiff; 
and if upon the trial of such action, both parties shall be found guilty of any one or 
more of the causes of divorce, then a divorce shall not be granted to either of said parties. 
14S. L. 1927, chapter 93, sec. 2 (C. S. A. chapter 56, sec. 3). entitled "an act 
amending 5594, concerning divorce and alimony," provides that the district court shall 
have jurisdiction of all actions for separate maintenance and the county court of such 
actions for separate maintenance where the complaint avers that the plaintiff does not 
ask or seek alimony in excess of $2,000. (This provision also repeated in section 3. 
S. L. '33, chap. 72, C. S. A. chap. 56, sec. 27). 
"In any action for divorce and alimony or for separate maintenance, the answer 
of the defendant shall contain: I. A general or specific denial of each material allegation 
in the complaint intended to be controverted by the defendant. 2. A statement of any 
new matter if any is relied on constituting a defense or constituting an action for divorce 
or separate maintenance in ordinary and concise language without unnecessary repetition. 
"Except as in C. S. A. chapter 56, sec. 7, supra, which provides that if both parties 
are guilty there is to be no divorce. Possibly in such case there can be a decree of separate 
maintenance if asked for in the cross complaint. 
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living apart from her husband and is being supported by him, 
but without being divorced from him." 
Perhaps the best discussion of the difference between the 
two is found in an Arizona case of Williams v. Williams,16 in 
which the court says a husband may sue his wife for absolute 
divorce on the grounds of desertion after she has obtained a 
decree of separate maintenance from him and the husband has 
in good faith attempted a reconciliation which she has refused 
and continues to refuse, 17 but he cannot do this if she has ob-
tained a divorce a mensa et thoro. 
"The action for separate maintenance and the action for divorce 
mensa et thoro are not the same, as the former has for its object the 
compelling of a husband who has wilfully deserted or abandoned his 
wife or who has committed acts that would give cause for an action for 
a.n absolute divorce to provide support for his wife and children. The 
judgment does not expressly authorize the wife to live separately and 
apart from her husband. That is probably what happens, but, if so, it 
is not under the sanction of a court decree, whereas under a decree of 
separation from bed and board the refusal of the wife to cohabit with 
the husband is so sanctioned and authorized."18 
It is not known whether the Colorado courts would 
make this distinction. A reading of the cases leads me to be-
lieve that they have seen no difference between the two actions 
or that such distinction was never called to their attention.19 
Certainly the Colorado legislature saw no distinction/9A 
for the '33 statute,20 "An act relating to marriage and di-
vorce," reads: Section 1. "An action for separate mainte-
nance (divorce from bed and board) [sic] may be maintained 
by a wife." 
18Williams v. Williams. 265 P. 87. 61 A. L. R. 1264. 
"Appleton v. Appleton, 97 Wash. 199, 166 Pac. 61. 
18Williams v. Williams, supra. 
'"Although the point was not really raised in Austin v. Austin, 42 Colo. 130, the 
language of the court there seems to imply that such distinction does not exist. There 
the court finds that a decree of separate maintenance "is not objectionable as leaving the 
question of reconciliation entirely in the wife's hands." (Objection was not made be-
low.) From which it follows that a wife could live apart from her husband as long 
as she wished, even though be desired a reconciliation, without being guilty of desertion. 
In re Popejoy 26 Colo. 32. says a wife may seek alimony "even though she does 
not wish separation from the bonds of matrimony." (a vinculo) A statement that could 
have been made were the court distinguishing divorce from bed and board from a divorce 
from the bonds of matrimony. See also the cases cited in note 12. 
19AAn additional factor to support this contention is that the action for separate 
maintenance when previously mentioned has always been as part of a divorce statute 
with no separate mention in title. 
"'S. L. '33 chap. 72, C. S. A. chap. 56, sections 25-32. 
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It seems quite possible that the 1933 statute, as it relates 
to separate maintenance, 21 merely sets out the judge~made law 
of Colorado. But it is submitted that this is not wise or for~ 
ward~ looking legislation. It places in our statutory law some~ 
thing that might better be forgotten. 
If we must have such a divorce, the law should provide 
for a merger of the decree after a certain time into one of abso~ 
lute divorce in case there is no reconciliation. The promotion 
of reconciliation seems to be the only sensible basis for limited 
divorce22 and this can just as easily be obtained under an inter~ 
locutory decree of divorce a vinculo.23 But we do not need 
such a divorce, and Colorado would be stepping forward if she 
abolished it. 
nThe statute also provides that the courts shall have power to specifically enforce 
marriage settlement and separate maintenance agreements whether the parties thereto are 
divorced or not. Many husbands and wives will separate no matter what the law. 
Therefore as a matter of practical policy it seems proper to give legal sanction to fair 
agreements relating to support and property rights. 
"But Colorado law, C. S. A. chap. 56, sec. 25 (b)-a wife may maintain the 
action if she has been abandoned "and a reconciliation is not probable." 
"This may well be the basis of West Virginia's action in repealing its statute allow-
ing limited divorce ( 1931). West Virginia bad before that time allowed such merger. 
Louisiana provides (see Vernier, supra. p. 422, and 1938 supplement p. 76) 
that where there has been no reconciliation after the expiration of one year from the 
obtaining of the decree of limited divorce, the successful party may apply for an absolute 
divorce. The party against whom the limited divorce was obtained may apply for an 
absolute divorce after one year and sixty days from the obtaining of the decree of limited 
divorce. But in Louisiana a limited divorce is a necessary prelude to an absolute divorce 
and is really in the nature of an interlocutory decree. Since Colorado has such: it is 
submitted that there is no need here for a limited divorce, even though made just and 
fair as in Louisiana. 
THE COLORADO VIEW ON ALTERATION OF 
TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS 
By MARVIN L. BROWN and EUGENE SCHAETZEL, School of 
Law, 19 39, Denver University 
T HIS discussion will be limited to a consideration of the legal effect of alterations made in a will after its execution by the testator, in the absence of a re~execution in statu-
tory manner. · For the purpose of discussion there shall be 
presumed previous proof that any change was made by the 
testator, himself, and not by some other person. Obviously, 
there is no concern over alteration of an holographic will, but 
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only over alteration of a testamentary instrument where there 
has clearly been no compliance with statutory requirements. 
Testamentary alterations of this nature are not such as are 
intended to work a revocation of the whole instrument, but 
are only those intended to work a change as to one or more 
parts of the instrument, leaving the remainder as originally 
executed. 
Such alteration seems to give rise to four possible effects 
in law: ( 1) the alteration might act as a total revocation of 
the instrument: ( 2) the alteration might act as a partial revo-
cation of so much of the instrument as is affected; ( 3) the 
alteration might be ignored and the instrument admitted to 
probate in its original form; ( 4) the will might be given effect 
as altered. No attempt will be made here to exhaust and 
explain the authorities on this subject as there is a complete 
survey of the field in 62 A. L. R. 13 76 and 115 A. L. R. 715. 
Instead, there is given here a mere summary of the general 
rules pointed out by the cases, and an attempt to determine 
from them which of these rules Colorado should adopt in the 
various situations. 
Before it is possible to determine whether an alteration 
may operate as a total or partial revocation, the possibility of 
revocation pro-tanto must be determined. If revocation pro-
tanto is possible an alteration may have the effect of revoking 
part of a will even though the ultimate purpose of the testator 
in giving effect to the will as altered is not accomplished. The 
possibility of revocation pro-tanto depends upon the particu-
lar statute of the jurisdiction. Colorado's statute concerning 
the revocation of wills states: "No will shall be revoked other-
wise than by," etc./ unlike statutes commonly found else-
where which begin "No will or any part thereof shall be re-
voked otherwise than by." It has been almost uniformly held 
as to statutes such as that in Colorado that revocation pro-
tanto will not be permitted, since by omitting reference to 
a part of the will the legislature has indicated an intent that 
there can be no valid revocation of such a part. 
Where the statute does impliedly authorize a revocation 
pro-tanto by words included therein, it differs distinctly from 
an act such as Colorado's and should have no authoritative 
'1935 C. S. A .. Ch. 176, Sec. 40. 
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effect in the construction of our act. On the other hand, the 
very fact that Colorado adopted her act in view of a majority 
holding that such an act would not admit of partial revocation 
would seem to preclude all arguments to the contrary. Under 
either type of statute the doctrine of dependent relative revo-
cation may apply in this situation. Under this doctrine, if 
the cancellation were relative and dependent upon the efficacy 
of the substituted portion, then, since the substituted portion 
cannot be given effect because of the failure to comply with the 
wills act, the will is reestablished as originally executed, as it 
is presumed that the testator did not intend to cancel the de-
leted portion in any event but only upon the condition that 
the substituted portion be given effect. The same result is 
reached under a statute such as that in Colorado without the 
application of the doctrine since it is here impossible to make 
a partial revocation in any circumstances except perhaps where 
the original contents are incapable of proof. Under circum-
stances where there is shown to be an absolute intent to revoke 
a part of the will in spite of a failure of the interlined portion, 
then states with the type of statute differing from that in 
Colorado will disregard dependent relative revocation and 
allow the revocation pro-tanto; here the doctrine of dependent 
relative revocation has no application. 
Interlineations may be of many different types, but of 
whatever type they are generally disregarded. Where they 
would operate as dispositive provisions they are everywhere 
void for non-conformity with the wills act. In such cases, 
the fourth possibility of solution above suggested is never 
employed. Where the alterations are merely inserted to ex-
plain and clarify parts of the original will and are therefore 
not intended to affect the substance of any gift, they may 
either be disregarded or recognized to be without force in 
probate. 
Of course, there is a possibility of revocation pro-tanto 
by operation of law, wherein the impelling force arises inde-
pendently of the testator's act. Fraud or undue influence 
upon the testator by one of the beneficiaries may operate to 
revoke the will in part, but the other beneficiaries should not 
be forced to suffer by this wrong so the remainder of the will 
should be probated as it stands. This result will be reached 
116 DICTA 
by a court under either type of revocatory statute since the 
court will prevent the fraud without regard to the testator's 
ability to revoke his will. Although the statute does not 
recognize this latter type of revocation pro-tanto, the court 
will accomplish its end by use of other powers. Colorado 
courts have worked such a partial revocation several times and 
have indicated an intention to follow the above-stated rule. 2 
Now, with the benefit of the foregoing analysis of possi-
bilities of revocation pro-tanto, let us undertake the task of 
determining how Colorado's courts would rule upon the dif-
fere.11 t propositions previous} y set forth: 
( 1) Although Colorado cases on all points akin to the 
revocation of wills are meager, we may assume that an at-
tempted partial revocation will not work to void the will 
completely unless the revoked portion is such a material part 
of the will as to imply an intent to revoke the whole. The 
early case of Glass v. Scott, 14 Colo. App. 377, 60 P. 186 
( 1900), recognized that the mere drawing of a line through 
the testator's signature would revoke the will. In like man-
ner any cancellation of other material parts of a will should 
operate similarly if it showed a revocation by obliteration 
combined with an intention to revoke the whole. Where can-
celling and interlining is carried to such an extent as to amount 
to a complete revision of the will, then it would seem that the 
testator has intended that his original will should be revoked 
in original form and the court, recognizing this obvious intent, 
should declare the will void as an obliteration within the 
statute. Partial cancellation should have no similar effect 
even though the full intent of the testator cannot be carried 
out, since the leaving of the major portions of the will un-
touched indicates that the testator wanted the original will 
to stand in force. 
( 2) Partial revocation will be effected by operation of 
law to prevent fraud, but it cannot be accomplished by the 
voluntary act of the testator except by impossibility of proof 
of the original context. Practically, it is possible that the 
testator could so completely obliterate a small portion of his 
'Snodgrass v. Smith, 42 Colo. 60, 94 P. 312; Ireland v. Hudson, 92 Colo. ll 0, 
18 P. (2d) 311; Frazier v. Frazier, 83 Colo. 188, 263 P. 413; Jeffreys v. Trust Co .. 
97 Colo. 188, 48 P. (2d) 1019. 
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will as by erasure or cutting that it would be impossible to 
determine the content of the deleted portions. Under such 
circumstances we might expect the court to be very strict in 
determining whether or not an intention was indicated to 
revoke the whole by cancellation of a material portion. How-
ever, if it is determined that the portion is not essential there 
is no reason why the instrument should not be accepted for 
probate with allowance that the deleted portion might be later 
inserted by acceptable proof of its contents if this proves pos-
sible. It is immaterial here that there be interlineations in 
conjunction with the attempted partial revocation, since they 
cannot be of force and the partial revocations will not be recog-
nized if susceptible of proof. If the context of the partial 
revocation is not susceptible of proof, then the will should 
simply be admitted to probate with any interlineations omit-
ted and with the deleted portions blank. The note in 62 
A. L. R. above quoted on page 114, collects the authorities 
supporting this view. Hence in this single situation there is 
a possibility of revocation pro-tanto in Colorado arising 
through inability to prove the contents of the deleted portion. 
This is the most desirable result though apparently not au-
thorized by statute. 
As a result then, partial revocation in Colorado will fail 
to take effect and the will can be probated in the form in which 
originally executed, or with blanks. This seems to be a very 
logical result in view of Colorado's narrow statute, since it 
will prevent the imposition of frauds upon the court. If par-
tial revocation were allowed in spite of the seeming statutory 
intent as it exists, we might expect evildoers oftentimes to 
attempt to change the will between the time of finding and 
the time of delivery to the court. 
(3) We have seen above that partial cancellation and 
attempted change will not act either completely or partially 
to void the will except in the one situation of inability to 
prove the contents of the deleted portion. Logically, there-
fore, we come upon the rule which should be applied in ordi-
nary circumstances. The will, not intended to be completely 
revoked and not capable of being probated as partially re-
voked where the contents can be proved, should be probated 
as originally executed disregarding all attempted cancellations 
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and interlineations. Apparently, most will changes are of 
the nature wherein there is a partial cancellation combined 
with an interlineation, but as yet the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado has never been called upon to rule as to the effect of this. 
It has been stated by our court that revocation cannot be 
effected (by "the testator's act) except in the manner provided 
for in the statute. 3 A recent case in the trial court completely 
sustains the view here taken.~ 
( 4) The previous discussion is sufficient to show that 
there is no support for a view that Colorado would give effect 
to the will as altered except in the situation where the alteration 
consists solely of an obliteration and it is impossible to prove 
the contents of the obliterated portion. In that situation the 
will should be admitted to probate with the obliterated por-
tions blank, and hence the will is given effect as altered. In 
all other situations this could not be accomplished. 
"Twilley v. Durkee, 72 Colo. 444 at 462, 211 P. 668. 
'In re Jones, Estate No. 60817, County Court of City and County of Denver. 
THE TAXPAYER'S DAMNUM: ABSQUE INJURIA 
By LOIS GESSFORD CLARK, School of Law, 1939, 
Denver University 
T HE taxpayer, now deceased, who hailed the case of The Farmers Loan and Trust Company, Executors v. Min-nesota1 of 1930, the cases following it, and the Fed-
eral Interpleader Act2 of 193 6, as the solution to the op-
pressive burden of paying two state inheritance taxes on his 
intangibles, is stirring uneasily in his grave; and the taxpayer 
who has survived the tax burden thus far, is shaking per-
ceptibly in his shoes, and is wondering just what the Supreme 
Court of the United States did mean in The Farmers Loan and 
Trust Company case when it said, "We have determined that 
in general intangibles may be properly taxed at the domicile 
of their owner, and we can find no sufficient reason for saying 
that they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity against tax-
'280 u. s. 204. 
'28 U. S. C. A., para. 41 (26). 
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ation at more than one place similar to that accorded to in-
tangibles.'' 
The case expressly overruled Blackstone v. Miller,3 
which held that the testamentary transfer of intangibles was 
taxable both at the debtor's and at the creditor's domicile 
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The court 
pointed out that the case· of Coe v. Errol/ though cited 
to support the proposition, does not say that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not prohibit double taxation. That The 
Farmers Loan and Trust Company case does stand for the 
proposition that the double taxation there was unconstitu-
tional is made clear by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Stone who points out that although he is in agreement with 
the holding of the case, it is not on the grounds that double 
taxation is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
same proposition was repeated by the court in Baldwin v. 
Missouri5 and the First National Bank of Boston v. Maine6 
when it said, "Due regard for the processes of correct think-
ing compels the conclusion that a determination fixing the 
local situs of a. thing for the purpose of transferring it in 
one state, carries with itan implicit denial that there is a local 
situs in another state for the purpose of transferring the same 
thing there * * * that shares of stock, like other in-
tangibles, constitutionally can be subjected to a death transfer 
tax by one state only." 
It should be noticed that in these three cases, The Farmers 
Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota, Baldwin v. Mis-
souri, and First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, the 
court was refusing to allow the transfer at death of an 
intangible to be taxed by two states on inconsistent theories. 
The theory of the state of the debtor's domicile was that it 
could tax the succession to the intangibles since the chose in 
action was created and existed by virtue of its laws; the theory 
of the state of the decedent's domicile was that under the old 
rule of mobilia sequuntur personam, the domicile governs the 
transfer and succession at death to an intangible and so it could 
tax that succession. It seems almost elementary, therefore, 
1 188U.S.l89. 
•116U.S.517. 
"281 u.s. 586. 
"284 u.s. 312. 
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that if it is unconstitutional double taxation for two states 
to tax the transfer of intangibles, basing their power on two 
inconsistent and different theories, it is even more clearly a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for two states to tax 
the same transfer of intangibles on the same theory, that is, on 
the theory that each state is the domicile of the decedent. 
We have it from eminent authorities7 that every person 
has at all times one and only one domicile, and yet in spite of 
this rule and in spite of the pronouncement of the court as to 
the unconstitutionality of double taxation of intangibles by 
states in The Farmers Loan and Trust Company v. Minne-
sota and similar cases, in the case of Dorrance et al. v. Martins 
the Supreme Court of the United States refused to grant 
certiorari even though both New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
had decided it was the decedent's domicile and had proceeded 
to collect a tax on the succession to the decedent's intangi-
bles. This refusal to grant certiorari, although it settled the 
case, did not give as clear cut a decision on the issue as could 
be hoped for and the taxpayer continued to hope that the 
Supreme Court meant what it said in The Farmers Loan and 
Trust Company case about the unconstitutionality of double 
taxation. The question of domicile, of course, is a question 
of jurisdiction, and may be inquired into by other states when 
the question is properly raised there. This is not precluded 
by the full faith and credit clause, since if the court has no 
jurisdiction, it cannot render a valid judgment or decree which 
must be recognized in sister states. Therefore, even if state A 
decides the decedent is domiciled there, state B may also decide 
that the decedent is domiciled in state B, and both states claim 
the power to collect an inheritance tax on the intangibles of 
the decedent; and in a more rare situation both states may 
decide that the decedent was not a domiciliary, and he will 
slumber on peacefully in his grave taxed by neither state. 
The taxpayer, after The Farmers Loan and Trust Com-
pany case had raised his hopes and the Dorrance case had 
dulled them, discovered in the Federal Interpleader Act of 
19369 what he thought was his salvation from the anomaly 
of two states or forty-eight deciding that he was domiciled 
'Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Sec. 10. 
•z9s u. s. 678. · 
•zs U. S. C. A .. para. 41 (26). 
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there. This act seemed to provide a procedure which was so 
perfectly suited to his case that he dared to predict that the 
Supreme Court would remember what it had said in The 
Farmers Loan and Trust Company case and uphold his con-
stitutional right to be free from double taxation by states and 
the right of his personal representative to bring suit under 
the act. 
Briefly, the act which was reall" "'rt amendment to sec-
tion 24 of the Judicial Code, provides that the United States 
District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of bills of in-
terpleader and bills in the nature of interpleader, filed by any 
person, firm, or corporation having in his possession money 
or property of the value of five hundred dollars or more which 
two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different states are 
claiming. The Complainant, the one who files the bill, is 
required to deposit the money or property in the registry of 
the court or give bond for it; and the bill expressly declares 
that such a suit may be brought even though the titles or claims 
of the adverse claimants do not have a common origin, are not 
identical, but adverse and independent of each other. The 
suit may be brought in the district court of the district in 
which one of the claimants resides and the district court has 
the power to issue process for all claimants, and to issue in-
junctions restraining the claimants from instituting or prose-
cuting any suit concerning the claim in a state or federal court. 
Since this act seemed to cover precisely the case of tax officials 
of two states claiming an inheritance tax on intangibles on the 
basis of domicile of the decedent, in 1936 the suit of Worcester 
County Trust Company v. Long10 was brought in the Dis-
trict Court for the district of Massachusetts by a Massa-
chusetts executor and citizen. On June 26, 1935, the will of 
Robert H. Hunt had been admitted to probate in Massa-
chusetts and the complainant was appointed executor. At his 
death, Mr. Hunt owned a bank deposit and other intangibles 
in Massachusetts and a. bank deposit in California. On July 
29, 1935, the Security First National Bank of Los Angeles 
was appointed administrator with will annexed in ancillary 
proceedings in the Superior Court of California. Tax offi-
cials of both Massachusetts and California asserted that Mr. 
'
0 14 Fed. Supp. 754. 
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Hunt was domiciled there and each claimed a considerable sum 
as inheritance taxes on his intangibles. On the grounds that 
this was a denial of due process, a denial of equal protection 
of the law, and that there was an adequate remedy at law, the 
Massachusetts executor filed suit under the Interpleader Act 
of 193 6, interpleading the tax officials of Massachusetts and 
California. From a practical standpoint the executor was in 
difficulty since prolonged litigation would cause the estate 
great expense, prevent distribution immediately, and compel 
the executor to keep large cash reserves on hand at little or no 
interest to pay the taxes. The complainant asked that the 
court grant him a temporary injunction against the tax offi-
cials and decide the domicile of Mr. Hunt so that the tax could 
be paid. The District Court granted a temporary injunction 
and the taxpayer's hope of a solution to his problem seemed 
about to be realized. 
His hopes, however, were short-lived for on March 15, 
193 7, the Circuit Court of Appeals11 for the First Circuit re-
versed the decree granting the injunction; and on December 6, 
193 7, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certi-
orari12 leaving the taxpayer back in his dilemma. He must 
pay two state inheritance taxes on his intangibles in spite of 
the fact that among the words of the court refusing certiorari 
appeared the following: "This court has held states statutes 
construed to impose death taxes upon the intangibles of de-
cedents domiciled elsewhere infringe the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and it has accordingly reversed judgments of state courts 
enforcing such liability." The court thereupon cites the case 
of the Farmers Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota and 
the First National Bank v. Maine. 
The court based its refusal of certiorari on the following 
propositions: 
1. This is a suit against a state and violates the Elev-
enth Amendment. 
2. The petitioners do not assert that the tax laws of 
Massachusetts and California include the taxation on death 
of the intangibles of those domiciled in other states, or that 
11 89 Fed. 2nd 59. 
12302 u. s. 292. 
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the courts of those states have ever held that their laws should 
be thus applied. 
3. No constitutional provision requires uniformity of 
judicial decision by state courts. 
As to the first of these propositions, that is, that such a 
suit violates the Eleventh Amendment, the case of ex parte 
Young13 settled that question. ·A suit against an officer of a 
state is not necessarily a suit against a state. If an officer is act-
ing unconstitutionally or illegally, even though under the au-
thority of a state statute, he is not the state for the purpose of 
such action and may be enjoined. In the case of tax officials 
being sued to prevent double taxation of the intangibles of the 
decedent, the tax official of one state must be acting unconsti-
tutionally and illegally, since a person is domiciled in only one 
state at a time. Therefore a suit to enjoin the tax official from 
collecting a tax unconstitutionally is not a suit against a state. 
As to the second proposition, that the complainant does 
not point to any state law or judicial decision of California or 
Massachusetts which holds that the intangibles of a decedent 
may be taxed in a state where he is not domiciled, the answer 
is that due process applies to substance as well as form; and 
that although a law may be constitutional on its face, and the· 
necessary notice and opportunity to be heard is given, never-
theless in its application the law may be unconstitutional. 14 
As to the third contention, that no constitutional provi-
sion requires uniformity of judicial decision, this is a general-
ity which begs the question. The complainant asserts that 
one of the states in question is acting unconstitutionally in 
demanding the inheritance tax on intangibles, since the Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that double taxa-
tion of intangibles violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It is interesting to note that the answers of the complain-
ant to the objections to bringing the suit were so highly re-
garded by Mr. Long, Tax Commissioner of Massachusetts 
and a claimant under the bill of interpleader, that he made no 
objection to the bill on jurisdictional grounds and approved 
the practice of bringing suit under the Federal Interpleader Act 
as a method of settling a question of disputed domicile. It is 
"209 u.s. 123. 
"Yick'Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356. 
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interesting to note also that Mr. Justice Stone, who wrote a 
concurring opinion in the Farmers Loan and Trust Company 
case, spoke for the court in the Worcester County Trust Com-
pany case. In the former case Ivlr. Justice Stone pointed out 
that he did not concur in the proposition that double taxation 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, but that he believed the 
transfer of intangibles on death should be taxed at the domicile 
of the decedent and not the domicile of the debtor, since the 
tax is an excise or privilege tax on the transfer of an intangible, 
which transfer or privilege is enjoyed in the state of the domi-
cile of the decedent. Even if these narrow grounds for the 
decision were accepted, this does not explain away the rules 
that one has only one domicile at a time, and that the domicile 
only can impose a transfer tax at death on intangibles; and 
when two states collect such a tax on the basis of domicile, 
certainly the taxpayer is being deprived of his property with-
out due process of law. 
It is thought by some that the taxpayer has a ray of hope 
in the case of Texas v. Florida, et al., 15 now in the Supreme 
Court of the United States.* Texas filed an original complaint 
in the Supreme Court against Florida, Massachusetts and New 
York to determine the domicile of Colonel Edward Green, 
who died possessed of a forty-four million dollar estate. Be-
cause of its indeterminate state, it is difficult to make a predic-
tion as to the real effect of the case; but since the Supreme 
Court took jurisdiction because this was a suit between states 
and not because a federal question as to double taxation might 
be involved, and sirtce Texas brought the suit to protect its 
own interests and not those of a taxpayer, it may well be that 
the most the case shows is a willingness on the part of the Su-
preme Court to cooperate to determine the true domicile of a 
decedent. 
At the present time, therefore, the taxpayer will be pro-
tected against double taxation on his intangibles at the domi-
cile of the debtor, which is not the domicile of the taxpayer, 
since the court has said this is double taxation and a violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; but his is a hollow victory 
indeed, when two states or forty-eight decide he is domiciled 
there and assess an inheritance tax against his intangibles. He 
'"301 U.S. 671; 302 U.S. 662. * (Decided in favor of Massachusetts.) 
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might just as well be philosophical and sigh, "Logic and taxa-
tion are not always the best of friends." 16 
"From the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds in Sonneborn Brothers 
v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506. 
FROM THE FLOOR OF HELL TO THE CEILING OF 
HEAVEN 
By HELEN THORP, School of Law, 1939, Denver University 
T HE law, it is said, is in a constant state of flux. In no field is this statement more apposite than in the field per-taining to aeronautics. The development of aircraft law 
presents one of the best examples of the adaptation (and, ac-
cording to some authorities, the overthrow) of ancient and 
well settled legal principles to present-day needs. 
The root of the trouble as far as aviation law is con-
cerned arose in the early part of the fourteenth century when 
(as has been asserted) 1 Cina da Pistoia offered his celebrated 
maxim, ''cujus estsolum ejus est usque ad coelum.'' In forming 
his rule of law, Signor da Pistoia gav:e little thought to Icarus' 
abortive attempt to conquer the air, and the courts in the fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries were totally unconcerned with 
the designs for flying machines then· being drawn by Cesare 
Borgia; s protege, Leonardo da Vinci. The maxim sounds so 
neat, so all-inclusive. The courts through the centuries hap-
pily announced it and embedded it in the law. 
The advent of the airplane as a practical thing presented 
no small problem. Its importance in modern commercial and 
economical life was not underestimated by the courts. But 
freedom of flight across the country could not be reconciled 
with the old maxim. 
Several theories were advanced by the courts and the 
writers to solve the dilemma. In general they were the theories 
of privilege, of zones of use-as of expected use-and of nui-
sance. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss or analyze 
these theories in any great detail. 
The nuisance theory has its basis in the idea that there is 
'76 Penna Law Review 631. 
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no trespass unless to physical land, but the owner of the land 
may have redress when the flight of aircraft over his property 
constitutes a nuisance.2 
In preference to that theory some courts of the United 
States have followed the theory of zone of expected use. Here 
the courts say that the owner of the soil owns so much of the 
column of air above as he may reasonably expect to use, but 
above that point the air may be used by anyone unless and 
until his acts constitute a nuisance.3 
Neither of the above-mentioned theories has received as 
much support in this country as has the privilege theory. This 
is the position taken by the American Law Institute in its Re-
statement of the Law of Torts. Here the old maxim is recog-
nized as to ownership of airspace above the land, and every 
unauthorized entry thereon is held to be a trespass, but such 
trespass is privileged until actual damage is suffered by the 
landowner or until the trespass becomes a nuisance.4 This has 
also been called the easement theory5 on the ground that the 
public acquires an easement in the airspace. 
. The theory has been criticized and recent decisions seem 
to indicate that those criticisms have not been unfounded. In 
1935, Leon Green felt that the question should not be said to 
be one of privilege, but rather of right; 6 that the restatement 
theory tel quel put the whole burden on the aviator when a 
better result would be reached by a more equal balancing of the 
burden between such aviator and the landowner below. This 
eminent writer casts out the old maxim as entirely unsatisfac-
tory today. 
And in the leading case of Hinman v. Pacific Air Trans-
port, decided in 1936, the federal court seems to have accom-
plished the same result. The facts of the case were not com-
plicated. Plaintiff owned land adjacent to an airport and 
alleged numerous and repeated fights over his land ranging in 
height from five to one hundred and seventy-five feet above the 
surface. But he showed no actual damage. The court held 
that flying above the surface of land is not a trespass, but is 
'Salmond on Torts (7th Edition, p. 238). 
'Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp. (1932), 55 Fed. 2nd 201. 
'Torts Restatement, Sees. 158, 159, 194. 
"35 Michigan Law Review I 123. 
"Journal of Air Law 6: 201-205. 
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lawful unless it results in injury to the owner in the use of his 
land. The result here is the same as that reached by applica-
tion of the restatement theory, but the method is, of course, 
far more direct. The court slashed through the red tape of old 
rules and new theories and laid down its rule of law. Its doing 
so7 was approved by Mr. Green in an article in the Illinois Law 
Review.8 It is to be noted that with this case the burden is 
taken from the aviator and thrown entirely on the landowner. 
He may have no recovery until he can prove actual damage. · 
The court didn't stop here, however, but went on to hold 
that· airspace is not the subject of ownership except as the 
owner of the surface below may so subject it as an incident of 
his use of the surface, and until that time it is open to naviga-
tion by aircraft. This is not a tendency to the zone of expected 
use theory, for here is no allowance of air to the landowner for 
what he may reasonably expect to use, but rather a flat denial 
as to him until he actually uses that amount of air above him, 
or uses it as an incident to his use below. Actual use instead 
of a reasonable expectancy is the test here. 
The case presents a federal court in contradiction with 
the restatement theory, which court is evolving rules for avi-
ation alone. The last word, of course, is for the Supreme 
Court and until it has spoken all roads are open. 
The Hinman case pales, however, when one considers the 
case of Tucker v. United Air Lines and City of Iowa City; 9 
from the District Court of .Iowa in 19 3 5. Here a suit by the 
city against Tucker and a suit by Tucker against the airline 
were consolidated for a single determination. Tucker owned 
land adjacent to the airport and sought to enjoin the company 
from flying planes at such low altitude as to interfere with the 
reasonable enjoyment of his property and with trees he had 
planted along his boundary line. The court enjoined the com-
pany from flying at an altitude lower than thirty feet. But it 
also enjoined Tucker from planting trees higher than twenty-
five feet on his boundary line as being an improper and unnec-
essary use of his property. 
This holding leaves one aghast. To follow it to its logi-
cal conclusion would mean that a landowner may use his prop-
'84 Fed. 2nd 755, Review 499 (1937). 
8 31 Illinois Law Review 499 ( 193 7). 
•supp. 1935 U.S. Aviation Reports I. 
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erty only in such a way as not to interfere with the flight of 
aircraft above. If he builds a house one inch in from his 
boundary line he may be enjoined from building a two-story 
house and commanded to build only a one-story house. If he 
desires to improve his land he may not have a tree higher than 
twenty-five feet, an absurdly small tree. And this is an "im-
proper and unnecessary use of property"! The positions are 
reversed. The landowner has the privilege and the aviator the 
right-the right not to be interfered with in his flight. 
Here is a taking of property without due process; here is 
a taking of private property for private use without compen-
sation; here is an impairment of vested rights; here is a denial 
of equal protection of the laws; here, finally, is a contradiction 
of the very spirit of the federal Constitution. 
The holding is not one of a court of last resort, and that 
seems to be its only saving grace. The case has been com-
mented upon very briefly in Columbia Law Review10 but not 
elsewhere to the writer's knowledge. 
The tendency then seems to be away from the privilege 
theory to a theory of right. And Colorado seems in line with 
this tendency. 
In 193 7, Colorado passed its first important Aeronautics 
Act. Previous statutes had dealt principally with the creation 
of a commission, its duties and powers.11 The recent act re-
pealed these statutes for the most part,12 and set up new ma-
chinery for the handling of the problem. It also made certain 
pronouncements interesting in the present discussion. The 
act was entitled: 
"AN ACT 
providing for the regulation of aeronautics within this state; providing 
for uniformity with the federal laws regulating aeronautics creating a 
state aeronautic commission; providing the powers and- duties of such 
commission; providing for promulgation and issuance of rules and regu-
lations by such commission." 
It went on to provide that the sovereignty in space above 
the lands and waters of the state rested in the state, except 
1036 Columbia Law Review 483-484; facts and decree also reported. 6 Journal Air 
Law; correction on fact, 7 Journal Air Law, 293, 622. 
"35 C. S. A. Chap. 17. 
12'37 Session Laws, Chap. 8L Sec. 14. 
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where assumed by United States law. 13 It then provided that 
· 'Ow.nership of space above lands and waters of this state is de-
dared to be vested in the severaJ·owners of the surface beneath, subject 
to the right of fight described in Section 8 hereof. " 14 · 
"Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this state is lawful. 
unless at such low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to 
which the land or water is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to 
.be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or 
water, or in violation of the air commerce regulations which have been, 
or may hereafter be, promulgated by the Department of Commerce of 
the United States. The landing of an aircraft on the lands or waters of 
another, without his consent, is unlawful. except in case of forced land-
ing. For damages caused by a forced landing, however, the owner or 
lessee of the aircraft or the airman 'shall be liable for actual damage 
caused by sucp forced landing." 15 
These sections are similar to Sections 2, 3, 4 and 11 of 
the Uniform Aeronautics Act adopted in twenty-one states 
and Hawaii. 
Colorado then concedes the ownership of the airspace 
above the land to be in the owner of the land. But such own-
ership is subject to ·a "right of flight." The privilege theory 
is discarded and the theory of a right is enunciated. Such flight 
is not a privileged trespass, but is lawful. Here, as in the Hin-
man case, is a denial of the red tape of the restatement. Such 
flight is lawful unless at such low altitude as to interfere with 
the then existing use to which the land or water is put by the 
owner. The words "then existing use" are important-for 
here is a rejection of the zone of expected use theory and the 
test is that of actual use. Again the statute enacts the holding 
of the Hinman case. 
The statute goes on, "or unless so conducted as to be im-
minently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the 
land or water"-and this, fortunately, would seem to be in 
contradiction to the holding in the Tucker case, for trees 
would certainly be lawfully on the land. 
It provides for damages in case of a forced landing only 
when actual damage is done, and would seem to put the 
burden on the landowner to show such damage. 
The Colorado statute is a progressive one and seems to 
enact those rules most highly favored by the courts at the pres-
ent day. It does something more than mere lip service to the 
'"Ibid, Chap 81. Sec. 6. 
"Ibid, Sec. 7. 
"Ibid, Sec. 8. 
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old maxim in that it seems to provide that when the land-
owner actually puts the airspace above him to use, he is the 
actual and undisputed owner of that amount of space. Thus 
it would seem that, if the zoning laws did not interfere, a land-
owner could for purposes erect an Eiffel Tower or an Empire 
State Building on his land without infringement on the air-
craft's right of flight, which is conditioned on the nonuser of 
the airspace by the landowner. 
The statute has not yet been construed by the Colorado 
court. It is to be noted that the Colorado statute, as well as 
statutes in other states, leaves the actual regulation of aeronau-
tics to federal authorities, and it is perhaps possible that the 
whole field will one day be subject to federal authority alone. 
This is the solution proposed by writers who disclaim all of 
the theories mentioned above and would hold the airspace to 
be a channel of commerce, analogous to navigable waters. The 
public would then have a natural easement in the airspace and 
if anyone would suffer it would be the landowner. · 
Signor da Pistoia' s maxim, then, has not been cast off in 
its entirety. Something of its spirit remains in modern law. 
But it has been remodeled, as have the ancient palazzos of his 
own Italy, to conform to modern needs-with electric lights 
and a landing field. 
JUST A HACKNEYED EXPRESSION 
On May 31, 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, speaking at 
Washington of the action of the United States Supreme Court in holding 
N. R. A. unconstitutional. publicly declared that we were no longer 
living in the "horse and buggy days." This striking way of stating a 
great truth thereafter achieved great popularity, partly because it was 
felt to be of most recent origin. 
Patient research, however, has brought to light the fact that it was 
eight years earlier and in Colorado that this cogent phrase and the idea 
which it expressed were in our times first put to official use. On April 
18, 1927, our own Judge John T. Adams, then o.ne of the members 
of the Colorado Supreme Court, said, in the case of Colby v. Board, 81 
Colo. 344, 353: "Even so we do not apprehend that we are now offend-
ing the rule of stare decisis as applied to any of our previous decisions. 
We are only applying old principles to new conditions or to the changed 
facts of modern life. Thus, a horse and buggy day decision in the livery 
stable case, Phillips v. City of Denver, 19 Colo. 179, intimately allied 
with those times, would be incongruous now if not considered in the 
light of moder.n industrial and civic development." 
BENTLEY M. MCMULLIN, of the Denver Bar. 
THE LAW'S DELAY 
By WILLIAM B. KING, of the Denver Bar 
In the address of Judge Phillips before the Denver Bar 
Association, printed in January DICTA, attention is called to 
a provision of the original Federal Judiciary Act whereunder 
writs of error might be brought at any time within five years 
from the rendering of judgment. The existence of such a 
provision gives rise to the suspicion that in former times there 
may occasionally have been some slight lack of celerity in the 
progress of litigation. 
The most protracted legal controversy of which this 
writer has encountered an authentic record lasted forty-eight 
years. It began right after the Civil War, and ended after the 
beginning of the World War. It originally bore the quaint, 
if meaningful. appellation: "United States against Fifty Bar-
rels of Whiskey." The defendant was lawfully at large on 
bail for nearly forty years, receiving intermittent judicial con-
sideration from the United States District Court in Louisiana, 
the old Circuit Court, and the Supreme Court. As an encore, 
the subject matter (I mean the controversy, not the defendant 
in propria persona) came before the Circuit Court of Appeals 
(created twenty-four years after the casus belli arose) and be-
fore the Supreme Court a second time. 
The genesis of this unseemly strife between two uneven! y 
matched antagonists, above named, was the commencement by 
the United States of a forfeiture proceeding in rem in the 
United States District Court in 1867. One Gaspard .Theurer 
came to defendant's aid and procured its release into his cher-
ishing custody by giving a bond therefor. Subsequent chro-
nology is: · 
April 4, 1868. Trial in District Court; judgment of 
condemnation and forfeiture. 
Apri/9, 1868. The defendant was saved by the loyalty 
of its bondsman, who took an appeal to the Circuit Court. 
May 2, 18 7 0. Appeal dismissed by the Circuit Court. 
May 18, 18 70. Although Gaspard Theurer's sympathy 
for the res defendant had spiritualized sometime since, its fair 
character was still not without a champion, and the case as-
cended to the Supreme Court on a writ of error. There it 
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slumbered for thirty-five years, apparently ·at peace with the 
world, the suitors and the respective counsel. There is no rec-
ord as to the behavior of the res defendant during this period, 
or whether it violated its recognizance by departing the juris-
diction. It must have become in some way opprobrious, for. 
nobody took the trouble to docket the case. 
December 4, 1905. Writ of error dismissed by the Su-
preme Court. 199 U.S. 615. 
February 3, 1906. Mandate entered in the District 
Court, "when, and when only," according to judicial pro-
nouncement, "the original judgment became final and execu-
tory." This devoutly to be wished for consummation having 
been achieved at long last, the judgment of condemnation 
apparently was not executed-whether out of respect for the 
age of the res defendant does not appear. After a mature con-
sideration of some five years, the government seemingly elected 
to proceed in personam. · 
August 5, 1911. Ancillary suit brought by the United 
States to enforce the judgment "against the heirs of his (Gas-
pard Theurer's) heirs and their heirs, even to the fourth gen-
eration." The language is that of the trial judge. Judgment 
for defendants. 
April 9, · 1914. Judgment affirmed by the Circuit Court 
of Appeals. 213 Fed. 964. A dissenting opinion held that 
the case ought to be remanded for further proceedings. 
January 11, 19 15. Further proceedings obviated by de-
nial of petition for certiorari. 235 U. S. 706. The Supreme 
Court no doubt felt that due deliberation had been accorded 
the controversy, and that no unseemly haste had prejudiced 
the substantial rights of any of the litigants. 
Query: Who got the whiskey? 
DENVER DIVORCE RECORDS 
Possibly a few sour notes or the "rift in the lute" was responsible. 
for the divorce action of Piccolo vs. Piccolo. It looks as though John 
was too much of an ambler and Henry was a confirmed joker, resulting 
in Ambler vs. Ambler and Wagster vs. Wagster, and we'll have to look 
into this one, because hubby didn't ask for a divorce from wifie when 
the case of Hubby vs. Hubby was filed. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE COLORADO JUNIOR BAR 
CONFERENCE 
By HUGH D. HENRY, Secretary-Treasurer* 
T HE purpose of this article is to give in compact, readabl-e form the By-laws of the Colorado Junior Bar Conference which were ratified at the meeting in Colorado Springs 
on September 10, 1938. 
Membership: All members of the American Bar Associ-
ation under the age of thirty-six years are members of its 
Junior Bar Conference and all members of the Junior Bar 
Conference located in Colorado are members of the Colorado 
Junior Bar Conference. Membership in the Junior Bar Con-
ference terminates at the close of the annual meeting of the 
American Bar Association following the member's thirty-
sixth birtpday. 
Affiliation: The Colorado Junior Bar Conference is a 
state unit of the Junior Bar Conference of the American Bar 
Association. 
•This is the second of the series of articles on the organization and program of the 
Colorado Junior Bar Conference. 
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Purpose: The purpose of the Colorado Junior Bar Con-
ference is to cooperate with and assist in the accomplishment 
of the programs of the American Bar Association and its Jun-
ior Bar Conference and the Colorado Bar Association, and 
assist and give attention to those problems peculiarly affecting 
the professional careers of the younger lawyers of Colorado. 
Meetings: The annual meeting is held at the same time 
and place as the annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion. In addition, two regional meetings will be scheduled 
yearly. 
Council: The Council consists of one member from each 
judicial district in Colorado elected by the members of the re-
spective districts present at the annual meeting. The chair-
man, vice-chairman, secretary-treasurer, and last retiring chair-
man are members of the Council. The Council forms the pol-
icy of the Conference and advises the chairman; it approves 
the appointments of the chairman and the filling of the vacan-
cies by him by two-third vote. It meets twice a year and spe-
cial meetings may be called by the chairman or by two-thirds 
of the members. 
Officers: The chairman is appointed by the chairman 
of the Junior Bar Conference of the American Bar Association 
after recommendation of the retiring Council. The vice-
chairman and secretary-treasurer are elected by the members in 
attendance at the annual meeting. The Council acts as a nom-
inating committee for these two offices and nominations may 
also be made from the floor. Neither the chairman, vice-chair-
man nor secretary-treasurer may be elected for two successive 
terms. 
Committees: All standing committees and all special 
committees created by the chairman or by the recommendation 
of the Council are appointed by the chairman upon approval 
of two-thirds of the Council. The standing committees are as 
follows: 
Membership 
American Citizenship 
Judicial Selection 
Public Information and Speaking 
Legal Ethics and Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Meetings and Arrangements 
Procedural Improvement and Proper Legislation 
DICTA 
Grievances 
Program Suggestions 
To Sponsor Newly Admitted Members of the Bar 
Bar Examinations 
Standards of Admission to the Bar 
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Committee members do not hold office beyond the term 
of the chairman appointing them, and any committee member 
may be removed by the chairman with or without cause. 
Amendment: The By-laws may be amended by a two-
thirds vote of the members voting at any regular annual meet-
ing, provided that a notice that such amendment will be voted 
upon, signed by at least ten members, must be filed with the 
secretary at least two weeks prior to the meeting, or the unani-
mous consent of the membership present at the annual meeting 
must be obtained. 
LEGAL INSTITUTES AID TO REVITALIZE BAR 
H AILED as evidencing a revitalized interest in bar asso-ciation activities, legal institutes in Colorado have be-come a definite part of bar association work as the 
result of three highly successful meetings. The seventh and 
ninth judicial districts will hold a legal institute in Grand 
Junction on April 15. Mortimer Stone and Max Melville 
will be the speakers. A fifth institute will be held in Colorado 
Springs on Saturday, April 22, when Wilbur Denious, Ed-
ward L. Wood, and Golding Fairfield are scheduled to speak. 
Plans are being discussed relative to the formulation of a series 
of institutes to be held in Denver this summer. 
Following the meeting at Greeley on February 4, the 
Arkansas Valley lawyers, with approximately 115 in attend-
ance, held an institute at Pueblo on March 10. It was the first 
gathering of lawyers, other than for local bar association func-
tions, in Pueblo in the history of the state. 
Laurence E. Langdon, president of the Pueblo County 
Bar Association, who presided at the institute, declared: 
"Never in my memory have so many lawyers, from cities other 
than Pueblo, attended any function sponsored by lawyers 
here. It is the first time Pueblo has had the honor of being the 
host of any meeting held under· the auspices of the Colorado 
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Bar Association. We all hail these institutes as a welcomed 
sign of a revitalized interest in bar association activities." 
The afternoon session was turned over to William R. 
Kelly, chairman of the Colorado Bar Association Committee 
on Legal Institutes. He introduced Albert J. Gould of Den-
ver, who discussed in a very able and entertaining manner tax 
problems of interest to lawyers. After dinner in the Congress 
Hotel, Mr. Kelly, as toastmaster, introduced the various mem-
bers of the bench and bar present. 
Judge Otto Bock of the Supreme Court spoke briefly on 
the topic of "Making Justice Easier to Get." . Judge Bock 
stated that the legal institutes showed that the profession was 
interested in simplifying procedure and that other signs indi-
cated that lawyers and law teachers were attempting to bring 
about reforms in legal methods. The federal rules of pro-
cedure were founded on the basic principle that justice should 
be easier to get. Research work in universities is being con-
ducted to attempt solution of present problems confronting 
legal procedure. At the present time, in the opinion of Judge 
Bock, what is most needed is a strong and cohesive union of 
lawyers which can use its influence to ensure necessary -~eforms. 
The main speaker of the evening was G. Dexter Blount, 
president of the Colorado Bar Association, substituting for 
Charles O'Conner of Boulder, who was prevented by illness 
from attending. Mr. Blount related the history of the legal 
institutes, and outlined the future program for their develop-
ment. "There is little doubt but that the legal institutes have 
rejuvenated the bar," he said. 
The evening session of the institute was devoted to a dis-
cussion of unlawful practice by Max Melville of Denver. 
Tracing the development of the prerogative of the courts from 
early English history, Mr. Melville discussed the attitude of 
the Colorado courts on the question. He stressed the point 
that the Colorado courts had not seen fit to follow the weight 
of the authority on many of the propositions involved and 
suggested that lawyers actively interest themselves in the prob-
lems. 
Following the Pueblo meeting, the San Luis Valley Bar 
Association held an institute at Alamosa on March 13. Leon-
ard Haynie of Alamosa, as president of the association, pre:-
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sided. The afternoon session was devoted to a fine exposition 
of chattel mortgages by Louis Hellerstein of Denver. Lawyers 
present evinced a great interest in the talk and especially as the 
discussion related to liens created by the sales and service tax 
acts. 
After dinner George H. Blickhahn of Alamosa presented 
his delightful fantasy of the Italian immigrant at a baseball 
game. Burris Goudy of Monte Vista contributed to the mer-
riment with a few witty remarks. A short outline of the ac-
tivities of the state bar association· and its present organization 
was given by Fred Y. Holland, its secretary. 
The evening session of the institute was devoted to a 
brilliant discussion of criminal law and its attendant problems 
by Kenneth Robinson of Denver. Thus closed the third insti-
tute to be held in this state. 
A large share of credit for the success of the Pueblo insti-
tute should belong to Harry Petersen, J. W. Preston, Tom 
Marsalis, and H. P. Vories, who, as members of the local com-
mittee, carried out the details of the institute. The Alamosa 
meeting was planned by W. W. Platt and Raphael J. Moses. 
Stewart Shafer of Cortez came the furthest distance to 
attend the Pueblo meeting. David Sarvas of Brighton claimed 
the second prize for distance travelled. The long distance 
award was made to Lou D. Mowry of Denver for the Alamosa 
institute. While Messrs. Robinson, Holland, and Hellerstein 
also attended from Denver, they were disqualified as being on 
the program. 
Raphael J. Moses of Alamosa disputes all title claims 
springing from the institutes. "I think I still hold a record," 
he writes, "in view of the fact that I am the only person who 
has attended all three institutes." Ray reports that in addi-
tion to "all of the able-bodied practicing lawyers in the dis-
trict," the clerk of the County Court in Rio Grande County, 
the court reporter for the district, and "one lone banker at-
tended the institute. Perhaps all of the bankers should have 
been present 'for the afternoon session, as they draw 90% of 
the chattel mortgages in this district." Page Mr. Mel ville! 
Wyoming, we understand, is planning a series of legal 
institutes, the first of which is to be held in Cheyenne. 
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Junior Bar Conference Holds Regional Meeting 
The second regional conference of the Junior Bar Con-
ference occurred in Pueblo on March 10. Twenty-seven 
young lawyers were present at the meeting which was held in 
the Navajo Room of the Bluebird Cafe. 
Mark Harrington, president of the Conference, outlined 
the origin and purposes of the Conference. He was followed 
by chairmen of the various committees who were present. H. 
Shields Mason of Denver, chairman of the membership com-
mittee; Hugh D. Henry of Denver, secretary of the Confer-
ence; Leo S. Altman of Pueblo, councilman for the district, 
and Wm. Hedges Robinson, Jr., of Denver, public relations 
director, all spoke briefly on the purposes and program of their 
departments. 
Reception to the program as outlined was highly enthu-
siastic, and members present began an immediate campaign to 
increase membership in the Conference throughout the state. 
Lawyers from nearly a dozen towns were at the meeting. 
A regional gathering will be attempted on the Western 
Slope early this summer, according to present plans. The 
second annual meeting of the Conference is scheduled in con-
junction with the state bar meeting. · 
Because he was recuperating from a recent illness, which 
had confined him to the hospital, J. T. Thomas of Antonito 
was not present at the Alamosa meeting. He was the only 
member of the bar from that city who did not attend. 
Jesse E. Pound, our local correspondent in Alamosa, 
writes that the opinion was unanimous that the "Alamosa 
Institute was a real success and should be repeated again before 
other local associations. Another institute in the valley will 
be well attended; there is no doubt of that." 
Regional Correspondents 
With this issue, the Colorado Bar Association Section of 
DICTA inaugurates a plan of regional correspondents. A cor-
. respondent has been selected in each district, whose duty it will 
be to send in items of interest to the legal profession so that it 
may appear in these pages. 
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The correspondents who have accepted this duty are 
GeorgeS. Cosand of La Junta, Charles J. Simon of Colorado 
Springs, Charles Corlett of Monte Vista; Jesse E. Pound of 
Alamosa, Judge J. Edgar Chenoweth of Trinidad, John W. 
O'Hagan of Greeley, C. H. Darrow of Glenwood Springs, 
Stewart Shafter of Cortez, Charles J. Ribar of Pueblo, R. 
Franklin McKelvey of Durango, George F. Dodge, Jr., of 
Montrose, and Dale E. Shannon of Fort Collins. Other corre-
spondents for the remaining regions will be announced shortly. 
Lawyers having news items of general interest to the pro-
fession are urged to send it to their local correspondents or to 
Wm. Hedges Robinson, Jr., 410 Midland Savings Bank 
Building, Denver. Any suggestions for improvement or ma-
terial for these pages will be appreciated. 
The Broadmoor Hotel will be the scene of the institute 
to be held in Colorado Springs on April 22, according to ten-
tative plans formulated by Leon H. Snyder, chairman of the 
committee in charge. Mr. Golding Fairfield of Denver will 
speak on "Developments in Real Estate Law of Interest to 
Practicing Lawyers," and Edward L. Wood will have for his 
subject "Automobile Liability." Wilbur Denious is also 
scheduled on the program. · 
Law Day at University of Colorado 
The University of Colorado Law School has set April 
29, 1939, for its annual Law Day. Prof. Ralph Aigler, of 
the University of Michigan, will be the principal speaker. 
His topic will be, "The Law of Banks and Their Customers." 
The program will commence at 10:00 o'clock in the 
morning and will include a 1 uncheon and dinner ineeting. The 
morning session will be held in the law school at Boulder, and 
the luncheon and dinner meeting will take place in the Student 
Memorial Building, according to present plans. 
Invitations to all lawyers within the state will be mailed 
from Boulder within a few days, according to Dean Robert L. 
Stearns. 
Legal Institute will be held at Grand Junction on April 
15, 1939. Mr. Mortimer Stone of Ft. Collins will speak on 
"Contracts for Sale of Real Estate" and Mr. Max Melville of 
Denver will speak on "Unlawful Practice of Law." 
Supreme Court Decisions 
JUVENILE COURT-DEPENDENCY-EVIDENCE-PETITION-AMEND-
.MENT-Davis vs. People, etc.-No. 14482-Decided January 16, 
19 39--Juvenile Court of Denver-Hon. Eugene Madden, Jr., 
Judge. 
HELD: 1. Evidence examined and found to be sufficient and upon 
which jury could base verdict of paternity of child. 
2. The petition for dependency filed in Juvenile Court before 
birth of child was properly amended at time of hearing to show birth of 
child in interim. 
3. Where the paternity of the child has been established beyond 
question, the law should be liberally construed to insure the necessary 
help to the child and mother, consonant with the father's ability to pay. 
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr. 
Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT. 
WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION--ELECTION-Stahura v. Industrial Com-
mission-No. 14465-Decided January 23, 1939-District Court 
. of Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge-Affirmed. 
HELD: 1. Where coal miner suffers injury to leg, and doctors 
contend it should be amputated at knee, but claimant refuses to submit 
to operation, and receives and accepts statutory compensation on basis 
that leg was removed, he may not later claim additional compensation 
on the basis of permanent partial disability, for if his disability is greater 
than it would have been with amputation, it is the result of his own 
election. 
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and 
Mr. Justice Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT. 
CRIMINAL LAW- INTOXICATION- DRIVING AUTOMOBILE- EVI-
DENCEv-CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES-Bauer v. People-No. 
14400-Decided January 23, 1939-District Court of Logan 
County-Han. Arlington Taylor, Judge-Affirmed. 
FACTS: Defendant found guilty of driving an automobile while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, having previously been con-
victed of a similar offense. 
HELD: 1. "To prove that a person was intoxicated it is not 
necessary to prove the process, often a secret one, by which he got intoxi-
cated." 
2. "The state of intoxication is a condition as to the existence of 
which even a lay witness may express his opinio.n." 
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3. It was not error for the trial court to admit evidence of previ-
ous police court convictions of drunkenness and of driving while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor, where the record shows it was ad-
mitted for purposes of impeachment. This is particularly so where the 
testimony of the defendant on direct examination opens the door for such 
evidence. 
4. The Supreme Court has no right to interfere with the deter-
mination of the facts by the jury, which were charged with the duty of· 
determining the credibility of the . witnesses and the weight of their 
testimony. 
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and 
Mr. Justice Bock concur. IN DEPARTMENT. 
WILLS-ELECTION OF SURVIVING SPOUSE-FILING ELECTION BE-
FORE PROBATE-In re: Estate of Stitzer. Peterson, etc. v. Stitzer 
-No. 14481-Decided January 30, 1939-District Court of 
Denver-Ron. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed. 
HELD: 1. An efection of a surviving spouse, not to take under 
the will of decedent, containing a provision reserving right to continue 
to contest probate of will, is valid although will is eventually admitted 
to probate and election is filed prior thereto~ 
2. Any written form of notice which accomplishes the purpose 
of informing those charged with the administration of the estate that the 
surviving spouse is dissatisfied with the will and is asserting statutory 
rights, is sufficient to constitute an election. 
3. Form of election examined and found .not to be' ambiguous 
as to intention of surviving spouse. 
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous; EN BANC. 
VENUE-REPLEVIN-EVIDENCE--Johnson Oil.. Inc. v. Rogers, eta!. 
-No. 14401-Decided January 30, 1939-District Court of 
Otero County-Hon. William B. Stewart, Judge-Affirmed. 
HELD: 1. Court did not err in granting change of venue upon 
application therefor, in replevin suit to county where the subject matter 
(property) of the action was located. (1935 C. S. A. vol. 1. p. 36, 
sec. 26.) 
2. Evidence examined and found to center around conflicting 
testimony as to oral agreement. Trial court's decision as to existence of 
such agreeme.nt wili not be disturbed. 
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and 
Mr. Justice Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT. 
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